Abstract-Security in sensor networks is more important than traditional networks as they are deployed in hostile environments and are more prone to capture. Trusted third party authentication schemes, public-key systems are not suitable owing to their high resource requirements. Key pre-distribution was introduced in [3] to solve this problem. Our scheme achieves identical connectivity compared to the random key pre distribution [4] using a less number of preloaded keys in each sensor node. The design of our scheme is motivated by the observation that at present most key pre-distribution schemes employ random mechanisms which use a large number of keys and are unsuitable for sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Wireless Sensor Networks (DSN) consists of numerous tiny sensors deployed at high density in regions requiring surveillance and monitoring. These sensors are memory as well as energy constrained. A typical sensor node consists of one or more sensing elements (motion, temperature, pressure, etc.), battery, low power radio transmitter/receiver, microprocessor and limited memory. An important aspect of such networks is that the nodes are unattended , have un-replenishable energy and network topology is unknown. Sensor networks deployed in a hostile environment are prone to different types of malicious attacks like eavesdropping, masquerading, traffic-analysis, etc. To provide security communication should be encrypted and authenticated. Traditional secure communication schemes [8] , [9] are not suited for sensor networks as they are more demanding in memory and computationally intensive.
The fundamental constraints under which the sensor networks operate prohibit them from using public key cryptosystems, third party authentication systems etc. These constraints are.
Resource Constraints: A typical tiny sensor node has about 20-30 joules of initial energy. This imposes a strong restriction on the processing capabilities and available memory in a sensor node. For example, a Berkeley mote has a 8-bit 4 MHZ processor which supports a minimal RISC-like instruction set without support for multiplication and other complex operations. Perrig et al. [4] showed that a simple RSA operation takes the order of tens of seconds on this processor. Moreover it has less than 4KB of memory after the node is loaded with the necessary operating system and applications. Hence the number of keys and the algorithms that can be stored on a node is very less. Short Radio Range: Sensor nodes are equipped with low power radio transmitters which have a very small transmission range of less than 20 meters. Thus a DSN uses multi-hop routing for sensor node to base station communication. Henceforth a base station cannot manage the key distribution for the nodes as it incurs high overhead. Hostile Environments: DSN's are deployed in hostile environments which make the nodes prone to capture. Using key distribution servers to establish shared keys is not feasible because a key distribution server if captured can disclose a large number of keys and thus is a single point of failure. Identifying these limitations our work extends the seminal work done in this area by Eschenauer et al. [3] . They introduced a random key pre distribution scheme in which each node is loaded with a set of keys randomly selected from a key pool. After the deployment phase neighboring nodes exchange information to establish common shared keys which are later used for secure communication. The basic idea behind this scheme is to have a large pool of keys, from which a set of keys is randomly chosen and stored in each of the sensor nodes. Any two nodes which are able to find common keys within their key subsets can use those shared keys for secure communication and authentication. The key idea of this method is relegate the key establishment process from a key distribution server to the individual nodes thereby making it viable in hostile environments.
Key pre-distribution schemes [3] , [5] , [4] where key information is distributed to all sensor nodes prior to deployment is the most feasible method for secure communication between resource-constrained devices. A naive way of achieving complete connectivity for a network of N nodes is to have N-1 keys stored in each sensor node. But this method is infeasible due to memory constraints on sensor nodes. To tackle the memory constraints problem a single key can be used network-wide for encrypting data. Although this approach has the least storage cost it is most vulnerable to attack as compromising a single node will cause the entire network's security to be breached.
Chan et al. [4] have extended the basic random scheme to enhance the security and resilience of the network using q-compositeness and multi-path key reinforcement. In the qcomposite scheme instead of nodes sharing single key they are required to share at least Õ keys to establish communication. This method claims to achieve higher security under the assumption that network is more prone to small scale attacks and is unlikely to be subject to a large-scale attack. However a higher value of Õ makes the network less scalable and connectivity is reduced. In the multi-path key reinforcement scheme security is strengthened between any two nodes by exchanging information between the two nodes using multiple paths. In this method although an increase in the number of disjoint paths increases the security, communication overhead increases substantially.
The drawback of the above proposed schemes is that they are not suitable for large scale sensor networks as they require each node to be loaded with a large number of keys. Perrig, in his work in 2001 [5] , showed that it is not feasible to implement public key cryptographic protocols in sensor nodes. These sensor nodes have less than 4KB of free memory after loading the necessary Operating System and other necessary applications. Implementation of key distribution schemes presented in [3] results in a requirement of memory for around 200 keys, thus occupying more than half the available memory. This aspect makes the previous proposed schemes impractical for large networks.
The motivation for our scheme is to reduce the number of keys to be loaded in each node. We propose a novel scheme, in which keys are assigned in a deterministic fashion so that any random deployment yields very high connectivity as well as high security among sensor nodes. The scheme is so modeled so as to maximize the connectivity with a small number of keys loaded in each of the sensor nodes. Our scheme requires as few as 25 keys to be stored by each node thus minimizing required memory space in sensors and this enables implementation of our scheme more practical in these sensor nodes.
Any two nodes that share keys have atleast two keys in common. Thus our method is inherently 2-composite. For any Fig. 1 . Simple Grid Scheme key vector assignment two nodes to securely establish a common shared key they need to have exactly two common keys. This restriction makes the scheme more secure against node captures as described in the key discovery phase.
Our Contributions are summarized as below First we propose a deterministic key pre-distribution scheme in which every node shares at least two keys with every other node. Each node has ¾¢ Ô AE ½ keys, where AE is the number of nodes in the network. This scheme although guarantees complete connectivity is infeasible owing to its large number of keys. Then we extend this simple scheme to our novel sub-key vector assignment scheme. This scheme trades off connectivity for key space thereby making the network more scalable. Then we extend this simple scheme such that each node get a set of different keys from Å mappings. In each mapping every node gets distinct set of keys. The final key set of the node is the combined set of keys from all the mappings. We use various metrics to show the tradeoffs in connectivity and memory and compare our proposed protocol with the random key pre-distribution scheme. We present analytical and simulation results to study the performance of our scheme in terms of security and connectivity.
Most of the previously proposed schemes tackle the issue of connectivity alone while assigning keys. In our proposed schemes we evaluate both connectivity and security. To analyze the performance of our schemes we use three metrics:
Probability È that two nodes share a common key is a good indicator of the connectivity of the network. We use this metric to show the effectiveness of the proposed protocols. The variance Î in the number of keys revealed per node, when Ü nodes are captured, which indicates the security performance of the scheme. È Î is the new metric proposed by us which combines the connectivity and security performance of the protocol.
A. Impersonation
This is an important factor that must be considered in thye deisgn of the algorithm. When node is captured all the keys for that particlular node are known to the adversary. Also, a significant number of keys are shared by other nodes. Hence an adversary upon capturing a node can masquerade as a node and try to estbalish shared keys with other nodes. Shared keys among nodes should not reveal any information about the pattern in which nodes shares keys. Our proposed algorithm does that exactly to minimize impersonation. Our scheme is resilient to impersonation because more number of nodes have to be captured to disclose all the keys of uncaptured nodes.
The rest of the paper introduces the basic subgrid scheme and some results on security are provided. Then we introduce the multiple-mapping scheme and evaluate its performance.
II. PROPOSED KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
This section describes the steps required to establish pairwise secret keys among sensor nodes. The following three steps are essential in a key pre-distribution scheme.
Key pre-distribution phase in which every node is loaded with a set of keys Î (key vector), which are generated by the key server. Key discovery phase where every pair of neighboring nodes AE , AE finds a key path. The key path is a direct link if Î Ì Î ¾ (AE , AE share exactly two keys ). If neighboring nodes do not share exactly two keys they find a logical path È through a set of intermediate nodes AE ½ , AE ¾ .... AE Ð such that a subsequence of È (AE ,AE Ñ½ ,AE Ñ¾ ,....,AE ) exists where consecutive nodes in the subsequence share exactly two keys. This ensures that two neighboring nodes i and j can securely use this path to establish a shared key. Our scheme requires nodes to have two keys in common to ensure better security and making it more resilient to node capture. Key establishment phase in which neighboring nodes use the paths computed in the key discovery phase to establish new pair-wise shared keys which are used for secure communication.
We introduce a novel key pre-distribution method in which each sensor node is loaded with a set of keys chosen using our proposed sub-grid scheme, which is an extension of the simple scheme described below. Figure 1 illustrates our simple pre-distribution scheme. First we construct a Ô Ò ¢ Ô Ò grid with Ò keys such that exactly one key Ã is at each position of the grid. A node AE gets the keys in row and column . Hence each node in this scheme gets a key vector of size ¾ ¢ Ô Ò ½. Note that in this arrangement every pair of nodes share atleast two keys in common. This ensures that every neighboring node can establish a common shared pair-wise key after the nodes are deployed. Figure 1a shows that sensor node A shares two keys with node B. Although the basic scheme guarantees connectivity, it is not suitable for sensor networks because it requires a significant number of keys to be allocated to each node. The proposed sub-grid based scheme trades off direct connectivity for key space in the nodes by reducing the key vector size in each node.
A. Grid Key Vector Assignment

B. Sub-Grid Key Vector Assignment
This scheme is an extension of the simple key vector assignment explained above. In this scheme the keys are placed in a grid of size Ô Ò ¢ Ô Ò which is divided into ¢ cells each consisting of Ñ ¢ Ñ´Ñ Ô Ò µ keys as shown in Fig.  2 . A node in a particular cell is assigned the keys from the sub grid as explained below. The key vector size depends on the parameter k which determines the number of keys shared between nodes. A higher value of reduces the key vector size at a node thereby decreasing the memory requirements for the keys. Also, a lower value of decreases the security of the scheme as capture of a single node discloses a large number of keys. However, a very large value of will produce lesser sharing of keys among nodes thereby decreasing the connectivity of the network. A suitable value of should be chosen to maximize connectivity while satisfying stringent memory constraints of a sensor node. 
C. Loaction awareness and neighbor discovery
To implement the algorthm no loaction information is necessary. A node only tries to estbalish pair wise shared keys only with nodes within comunication range. Neighboring nodes can exchange messages as follows. A node encrypts a message with its avialable keys individually and broadcasts the encrypted messages. All those nodes which have atleast one common key with the sender can reply by decrpyting using that key. Using this approach neighboring nodes can exchange and discover common keys without requiring location information.
D. Key Discovery Phase
Nodes loaded with their key vectors are randomly deployed in the area of interest. After the node deployment phase neighboring nodes exchange their node-id's to determine the number of keys they share. This can be done as the node-id can be used to determine the cell of the node that identifies the key vector of the node. Only neighboring nodes that share exactly two keys are allowed to securely communicate with each other by establishing a common shared key to form a direct link. Nodes belonging to the same cell and in the same row or column share more number of keys. However these two nodes are not allowed to use the common keys because capturing of a single node in that row or column reveals those keys.
E. Path-Key Establishment Phase
On completion of the key discovery phase all the neighboring nodes may not have established common shared keys. In order that a node establishes keys with non-key-neighbors, it must go through the path-key establishment phase. In this phase, a node searches among its key-neighbors recursively to find a key-path to the non-key-neighbor. For example in Fig. 2 node A and node C are non-key-neighbors. In order for node A to communicate with node C it must find a intermediate node such that it shares keys with nodes A and C.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Nodes deployed in hostile environments are prone to capture. Capture of a single node discloses all the information about the keys contained in them. An adversary can capture multiple nodes and use these keys to eavesdrop upon links. Hence the security of these keys is very essential for the overall security of the protocol.
We make the following assumptions about the adversarȳ We assume that an adversary can capture only a fixed number of nodes in the network.
Once a node is captured all the information is known to the adversary. The adversary can eavesdrop on any link and can decrypt the messages using the known key pairs.
A. Link Capture
We define link capture as the ability of the adversary to eavesdrop on the links between any two nodes. The adversary can decrypt the messages on a particular link, if the captured nodes disclose the keys shared between the nodes forming the link. This is a reasonable assumption because for Ü keys discovered it has to only check for Ü ¢´Ü ½µ combinations.
We use the following metrics to analyse our protocol: (a) AE : Number of nodes to be captured to compromise a single link across two specified nodes. (b) È´Üµ probability of link compromise for Ü captured nodes. (c) AE´Üµ Number of links compromised for Ü captured nodes.
(a) AE
We calculate the expected number of nodes to be compromised for capturing a particular link. First we calculate the probability that x nodes are captured for single link compromise. Then we find the expectation over all values of
Ü.
Let AE ÔØ´Ü µ be the number of ways of capturing x nodes such that the two keys are known.
Å´Üµ be the number of ways of capturing Ü nodes such that the two keys are not known: 
ÄÈ´Üµ
A smaller value of here increases the connectivity of the network. However the security of the scheme is compromised by making the value of too small. The value of can be tuned to provide the desired balance between security and connectivity. Typically, higher connectivity of a network trades off different security issues. In the proposed sub grid key vector key pre-distribution scheme the tradeoff depends on the parameter . The higher the value of the smaller is the size of each cell. Consequently, the connectivity is reduced and the security is better.
IV. SIMULATION
The effectiveness of the sub-grid key vector key predistribution scheme is tested through simulation. In the reminder of the section we show the impact of the value of on connectivity under our subgrid scheme. Next we show the memory savings in our scheme compared to the random key pre-distribution scheme. Connectivity and average path length metrics were calculated for varying values of density, key vector size and network size.
A. Experimental Setup
The simulation assumes that nodes are deployed randomly in the target region. The deployment is done with varying densities . We assumed a two hop neighborhood for our simulations. For our simulations a density is equivalent to nodes in a cluster. The simulations are done for different values of the sub-grid parameter and density . determines the average number of nodes that lie in the neighborhood of a node. Each simulation was run 100 times with different seeds for the random number generator for deployment of nodes and the results presented are the average of 100 runs.
The different phases of the key pre-distribution scheme have been simulated. The logical key space is first defined in the form of a grid and the nodes are distributed keys depending on their position in the grid that determines their identity based on the sub-grid key vector scheme described above. The nodes are then deployed at random. In the next phase a node finds out the nodes within its neighborhood it shares keys with. The cell to which a node belongs can be determined based on the identity of the node. The nodes share keys as specified by the key pre-distribution scheme in Section 2. Next we determine the connectivity of the network. With respect to a particular node, we determine if a path can be established between that node and every other node in the neighborhood, thus determining the connectivity of the network. Figure 3a illustrates the relationship between key vector size, density and connectivity for a 2500 node network. The graph gives a clear picture of the key vector size that needs to be selected to achieve the desired connectivity for a given density of node distribution. We can observe that the key vector of 42 keys gives more than 98% connectivity for a very sparse neighborhood consisting of 37 nodes. The optimal key vector size and density for more than 98% connectivity is along the edge of the cliff in the 3D-graph (Fig. 2a) . Note that as density increases the number of keys required to achieve desired 98% connectivity decreases. Figure 3b shows percentage of nodes within ×Ô·¾ (shortest path distance + 2 according to the actual deployment) in relation to key vector size and density. Larger 
B. Impact of Key Vector Size on Connectivity and Path lengths
C. Comparison to the Random Scheme
The performance of our protocol is compared with the random key pre-distribution scheme [3] . The number of nodes Ò that are used in the predeployment was fixed as 1000 under both the protocols. However we consider a cluster of 60 nodes for our simulation of post deployment performance. We test our protocol with varying values of . The key pool size for the random scheme is of size 10000 as in [3] . The key vector size under each protocol is same. Figure 4a shows a comparison of the average path length(for establishing shared keys between neighbors) under the two protocols using different key vector sizes. Figure 4b shows the relationship between connectivity and key vector size under the two protocols. Our protocol has better average path length than random scheme as key vector size increases. Although the random scheme is initially better it can be used because at such low key vector sizes its connectivity is very low as shown in Fig. 3b . Our protocol achieves the desired connectivity as low as 40% lesser memory compared to the random scheme.
In the next section we propose two deployment strategies in where each node gets its keys from multiple mappings of nodes to keys.
V. MULTIPLE LAYER PRE-DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES
Consider Å one-to-one mappings of AE sensor nodes to random positions in the grid . Our preliminary results indicate that a choice of a small constant for M yields good securityperformance trade-offs. In the given mapping , ½ Å , each node is assigned a set of sub-row and sub-column keys from its subgrid and adjacent grids as shown in Fig. 2 . For a given network deployment ,two physically adjacent sensors can encrypt messages using shared keys under one or more of these mappings.
Strategy 1 First keys are placed at each position in the grid. Then for a mapping the nodes are placed at each position on the grid randomly. The keys are assigned to nodes as in the sub-grid scheme. We impose a restriction on the placement of nodes in each mapping.
The mappings are such that a node does not get duplicate keys from different mappings. So, every node gets a unique set of keys in each mapping. Strategy 2 Unlike the previous strategy initially each grid position is occupied by a node. Subsequently in each mapping keys are placed randomly at grid positions. Similar to strategy 1, each node gets unique set of keys in each mapping
A. Key-Node Mapping Algorithm
Now we present the algorithm to assign the keys to nodes in each mapping ,½ Å . Let ÔÓ× be the array of sets representing the available positions for nodes/keys at the beginning of each mapping. Initially ÔÓ× contains all the points in the grid every node/key. The following steps are done for each mapping :
Each node/key ,½ Ò, is mapped to a position in the grid such that it can be placed in grid positions available to from ÔÓ× . For each node/key Ô Ó × is updated to the new set of available positions. This new set is obtained by removing the newly assigned keys/nodes to node/key from the set ÔÓ× . Note that the above approach is used for both the strategies presented above. Nodes and keys can be interchanged in the above algorithm to obtain mappings for the above two strategies. In the next section we evaluate the connectivity and security for the above two schemes.
VI. CONNECTIVITY
After the nodes deployed randomly in the area of deployment nodes within communication range try to establish pair-wise keys if they have common shared keys. Hence the probability that a given pair of nodes share at least one key, is a good metric for evaluating the connectivity. (a) Probability of sharing a key Ô ½ under strategy 1 .
The placement of the nodes in each mapping is not completely independent of previous mapping. The following equation gives the probability Ô that two nodes a share a key. Under this strategy two nodes share keys in every mapping if they are in adjacent cells. Otherwise they share a key if the same key is assigned to the nodes in different mappings.
Ô ¾
Probability that two nodes share a key Ô ¾ Probability that two nodes share a key in every mapping + Probability that two nodes are not adjacent and share a key 
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Nodes are grouped together under strategy2 and then keys are assigned to nodes. However in strategy1 keys are grouped together and then nodes are assigned keys. Therefore under strategy2 the capture of a single node discloses a number of keys which are shared by many nodes. But the capture of nodes under strategy1 does not disclose a significant portion of the keys of all the nodes. The captured keys are distributed evenly among the whole nodes in the network. However under strategy2 a large number of keys for some of the node's are disclosed. So, the whole set of disclosed keys have to be revoked and the number of available keys in some of the nodes is reduced significantly. But while using strategy1 individual nodes still have a large number of available keys. Although strategy1 gives lower connectivity it is better suited owing to its better security performance. Figures 7 and 8 show the security performance of the protocol. Obviously strategy1 has the lowest variance in the number of keys revealed per node. Under strategy2 and subgrid schemes the position of the nodes is fixed the keys are placed on them. Hence capture a of a single node reveals keys of all its neighbors. Similarly, the connectivity security shows the better performance of strategy1.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new pre-distribution scheme for wireless networks. It has nearly 40% lesser memory requirements compared to the random scheme. Our detailed simulation shows the gain in memory savings and better connectivity under our scheme compared to the random scheme. This makes our scheme more scalable compared to the previous schemes.
